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ABSTRACT 
 
This mixed methods study examines whether the rural/urban distribution of credit union/caisse populaire 
branches differs significantly from the general urban/rural demographic pattern in Canada. It also explores 
whether their distribution is different from that of banks, looking at the cases of Québec and Atlantic Canada. 
The study finds a rural tilt among financial cooperatives in Canada, and seven key informants present their 
views on the results. Their responses are categorized in two main themes: why financial cooperatives are over-
represented in rural and small town areas, and why they are under-represented in urban ones. A discussion 
follows, and directions for further study are provided. 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
 
Cette étude utilisant des méthodes combinées examine si la distribution des succursales de coopératives 
d’épargne et de crédit / caisses populaires en milieu rural et urbain diffère de façon importante de la tendance 
démographique générale des milieux urbains et ruraux au Canada. Elle aborde aussi la question de savoir si 
leur distribution est différente de celle des banques en observant le cas du Québec et du Canada atlantique. 
L’étude révèle une tendance rurale chez les coopératives financières du Canada, et sept répondants clés 
donnent leur opinion sur les résultats. Les réponses des intervenants sont divisées en deux thèmes principaux : 
pourquoi les coopératives sont surreprésentées dans les milieux ruraux et les petites villes et pourquoi elles 
sont sous-représentées dans les milieux urbains. Un débat s’ensuit, et des lignes directrices sont fournies aux 
fins d’une étude plus approfondie. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Each year the Co-operatives Secretariat (a unit within Agriculture Canada) publishes a series of reports on the 
state of cooperatives within Canada. Some of these reports are regular publications, such as Co-operatives in 
Canada and Top 50 Non-financial Co-operatives in Canada, and others are one-off research reports, such as 
Profile of Canadian Agricultural Co-operatives (1998-2002). In reading these reports, one is struck by at least 
two very clear patterns: first, the economic dominance of agriculture, broadly speaking, within Canadian 
cooperatives. These “agricultural” cooperatives include farm marketing cooperatives that dominate the top 50 
non-financial cooperatives and account for about one-quarter of revenues; farm supply cooperatives (fertilizers 
and chemicals, animal feed, seed, building materials, and petroleum products); cooperatives in fishing; and 
production co-ops in services such as grazing, agricultural machinery, animal reproduction, forestry, and 
handicrafts, the largest two components being management of feeder finance operations and grazing 
operations. The most recent figures indicate that agricultural cooperatives represent only 15% of non-financial 
cooperatives in Canada, but about 45% of revenues (Co-operatives Secretariat, 2011). The economic 
dominance of agricultural cooperatives occurs at a time when Canada is heavily urban in its makeup. 
 
The second pattern or trend is the striking growth of cooperatives in public services—particularly in housing but 
also in childcare, healthcare, and home care. Together, these cooperatives account for about half of non-
financial cooperatives in Canada, and housing cooperatives alone account for about 40%. Unlike agricultural 
cooperatives, these cooperatives in public services are predominantly urban and rely upon government 
programs. Although they make up a growing portion of non-financial cooperatives in Canada, they represent a 
relatively small portion of revenues. 
 
Our previous work discusses these patterns (Quarter, Mook, & Hann, 2012) and piqued our curiosity about 
financial cooperatives in Canada—that is, credit unions and caisses populaires. Do they also follow the pattern 
of rural dominance? This article presents the data from our analysis of credit unions and caisses populaires in 
Canada. 
 
Canada has had a long and strong tradition for developing credit unions since their inception in 1901 in Lévis, 
Québec (MacPherson, 1979, 1995, 1999, 2012). This study examines the extent to which credit unions and 
caisses populaires moved with the demographic change in Canada away from their rural, agricultural tradition to 
reflect population distribution. In that regard, we ask three questions: 
 
1. Does the rural/urban distribution of credit union/caisse populaire branches differ 
significantly from the general urban/rural demographic pattern in Canada? 
2. Do credit union/caisse populaire branches differ from bank branches in their 
urban/rural distribution? 
3. How can these data be explained? 
 
BACKGROUND 
The recent research literature on credit unions has addressed their challenges primarily in the context of the 
transformation into larger units and the impact that change has had on membership participation. In a historical 
analysis of the credit union development in Canada, MacPherson (2012) argues: 
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The Canadian credit union movement has gone through a series of periods or stages, 
particularly over the last eighty years, which can be understood as: formative, stabilizing, 
building, re-examining, and reformulating. The last two stages, re-examining and 
reformulating, are cyclical because credit unions are constantly buffeted by internal and 
external pressures and the need to adapt. The great challenge they face is how, amid those 
changes, they can retain their commitment to members, co-operative structures, community 
relations, developing appropriate government relations, and co-operative management. (p. 37) 
 
Senior management who feel that mergers into larger units are in the best economic interests of the credit union 
have to convince their membership of the validity of this viewpoint. Board members, on the other hand, who are 
a different stakeholder group than management, are obliged to listen to the people from their community who 
elected them; this can produce a dilemma that Cornforth refers to as “the tension between the conformance and 
performance” (2002, p. 4; see also 2004). The concern in organizations such as credit unions—or member-
based organizations in general—is that management will become too powerful and the board will be a weak 
representative of the membership (Spear, 2004). In a study of credit unions in Saskatchewan, Mavenga (2010) 
expresses the concern that mergers may cause credit unions to become more like banks and that they may 
become disconnected from their local communities. In response to such concerns, Ketilson and Brown (2011) 
set out a series of proposals to increase member voice and participation within larger organizations. 
 
Another factor comes into play in democratic member-based organizations: decision-making can be time-
consuming, especially when the issues are of great importance to the stakeholders. Addressing this issue in a 
different context, that of Aboriginal/government negotiations, Benson (2002) states: “[O]nly the long slow 
process of trust and relationship-building can provide the basis for successful multiparty institutional 
negotiations” (p. vii). Although the context differs, Benson’s point could be generalized to credit union change: 
multiple stakeholders are involved, and satisfying the needs of each group can be a time-consuming process. 
 
Although decision-making in banks and trying to create consensus around major issues also can be time 
consuming, the interests of senior management and of board members representing shareholders of a bank are 
likely to be aligned around increasing profits and expanding markets. In democratically structured organizations 
such as credit unions, however, there may be less agreement between management and board members 
representing the broader membership. Therefore, banks may be better positioned to initiate policy changes than 
credit unions, including the closure of branches. 
 
RATIONALE 
Little research bears directly on the issue that this article addresses: the demographic patterns of credit unions 
and caisses populaires. As noted, an earlier study by the authors on Canadian cooperatives found that there 
were two broad demographic groupings: cooperatives in such public services as housing, childcare, healthcare 
and home care that rely heavily on government funding programs and are found primarily in urban centres; and 
cooperatives that are financially self-sufficient and that market services either to a membership or to the broader 
public, found primarily in rural settings and small communities (Quarter et al., 2012; Quarter, Mook, & 
Armstrong, 2009). 
 
This study is exploratory and proceeds inductively. We first seek to determine the proportion of financial 
cooperatives in Canada located in rural areas and small towns; next, we attempt to determine whether the 
urban/rural distribution of credit union/caisse populaire outlets differs from that of bank branches (looking at the 
cases of Québec and Atlantic Canada); and finally, we explore possible explanations for the distribution of credit 
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union/caisse populaire outlets. The explanations, as noted, are speculative, but nevertheless have value and 
raise issues that could be explored deductively. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
This study utilizes a mixed methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative approaches to research 
(Creswell, 1998, 2003; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). The quantitative study is 
presented first, followed by the qualitative study. 
 
Quantitative study 
The purpose of the quantitative research was twofold: a) to determine whether credit union and caisse populaire 
outlets corresponded to the population distribution in Canada; and b) to determine whether the distribution of 
credit union and caisse populaire branches differed from that of bank branches. The first step was to compile a 
database of credit unions from those posted on credit union central websites;1 subsequently, we compiled a 
database of caisses populaires, based upon information obtained from Desjardins (Canada’s largest 
cooperative financial group, with most of its operations in the province of Québec). Once these steps were 
completed, we mapped the credit union/caisse populaire locations by the population size of the community in 
which they were located, using a combination of information drawn from Statistics Canada (2008) and Google 
Maps.  
 
Excepting Québec, we classified community size as follows: under 10,000 (rural and small towns); 10,000 to 
under 100,000; 100,000 to under 1 million; and 1 million and over. For the classification of “rural and small 
towns,” we used the criteria put forth by Du Plessis, Beshiri, Bollman, & Clemenson (2001, p. 11): “the 
population living in towns and municipalities outside the commuting zone of larger urban centres, i.e., outside 
the commuting zone of centres with population of 10,000 or more.” For Québec, we relied on Desjardins’ 
classifications for the distribution of their branches by community size. The categories were as follows: less than 
3,000; 3,000 to less than 5,000; 5,000 to less than 8,000; 8,000 to less than 12,500; 12,500 to less than 30,000; 
30,000 to less than 57,000; 57,000 to less than 200,000; 200,000 to less than 700,000; and over 700,000. For 
Québec, rural and small-town communities were considered to be those with a population under 8,000. 
 
To compare credit union locations to banks, we chose two regions for our initial exploration: Atlantic Canada, 
because the data were manageable, and Québec because Desjardins made the data available to us. For 
Atlantic Canada, we mapped the bank branches by community size using the same procedure as for credit 
unions (see above). For Québec, Desjardins provided a table of banks by community size using the same 
categories as for caisses populaires. 
 
Quantitative data findings 
We begin by presenting the data on credit union branches in English Canada. Table 1 shows the population 
distribution in English Canada by province on the left and credit union distribution by community size on the 
right. For English Canada as a whole, about 41% of credit union branches (814) can be found in communities 
with a population of under 10,000, or what we label rural and small towns (RST). In settings with a population 
over 10,000, we find about 59% of credit union branches (1,170). When credit union distribution is compared to 
the population distribution by community size for English Canada, it is evident that credit unions are more 
heavily clustered in RST areas, which represent only 18% of the population. 
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Table 1: Credit union branch locations in English Canada  
by community size 
 
In all provinces, there was a greater proportion of credit unions in rural and small-town locations when 
compared to population distribution. The extent of the pattern varied by province, but only in degree, with 
Saskatchewan credit unions being the most prevalent in rural communities (82%) and Ontario’s the least 
(16.5%) (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of credit union branches and population  
in rural and small towns (populations under 10,000*) 
 
 
* Québec RST data are for populations 8,000 and under. 
 
 
Total 
population 
Population distribution by community size (%) 
Total 
credit 
union 
branches 
Credit union branch distribution by 
community size (%) 
Province 
 Under 
10,000 
(RST) 
10,000 - 
99,999 
100,000 - 
999,999 1 million+ 
 Under 
10,000 
(RST) 
10,000 - 
99,999 
100,000 - 
999,999 1 million+ 
PEI 135,851 44.96 55.04 0.00 0.00 14 78.57 21.43 N/A N/A 
Nova Scotia 913,462 35.84 11.75 52.41 0.00 90 57.78 5.56 36.67 N/A 
New Brunswick 729,997 41.52 24.40 34.08 0.00 118 61.86 18.64 19.49 N/A 
Nfld. & Labrador 505,469 54.14 10.03 35.83 0.00 42 69.05 7.14 23.81 N/A 
Ontario 12,160,282 11.91 8.38 37.67 42.05 545 16.51 12.66 45.14 25.69 
Manitoba 1,148,401 32.34 7.17 60.49 0.00 215 58.60 6.05 35.35 N/A 
Saskatchewan 968,157 40.40 15.30 44.30 0.00 308 82.14 5.19 12.66 N/A 
Alberta 3,290,350 21.21 14.53 0.00 64.26 231 38.96 13.85 N/A 47.19 
British Columbia 4,113,487 13.06 19.65 15.84 51.45 421 21.38 19.95 14.96 43.71 
Total (except Québec) 23,965,456 18.40% 12.30% 30.31% 38.99% 
 
1,984 41.03% 12.45% 24.70% 21.82% 
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Table 2 examines caisses populaires in Québec, through data collected by the Desjardins system that includes 
both branches and service outlets.2 These data have the added strength of including not only caisse populaire 
locations but also banks, so that we can compare the representation of banks and caisses populaires in those 
locations. 
Table 2: Desjardins branch locations in Québec by community size, 2010 
 
 Population distribution  
by community size (%) 
Total  
credit union 
branches 
Credit union branch 
Distribution by community size (%) 
 Total 
Population 
Under  
10,000 (RST) 
10,000 - 
99,999 
100,000 - 
999,999 
1 
million+ 
 8,000 and 
under (RST) 
Over 8,000 - 
200,000 
More than 
200,000 
1 
million+ 
Québec 7,546,131 20.20% 12.01% 19.61% 48.18% 14 50.42% 19.65% 29.93% - 
Source: Statistics Canada (2008), 2006 Census 
For Québec, the data show a similar pattern to credit unions in English Canada: 50% of Desjardins branches 
are in communities of 8,000 and under, whereas only 20% of Québeckers live in such communities; strikingly, 
almost 36% of caisses populaires are in communities of 3,000 or less. In cities with a population of 700,000 or 
more, we find about 30% of Desjardins branches, whereas nearly half of Québec’s population is in comunities of 
1 million or more. 
Table 3: Desjardins and bank branches by community size in Québec 
 
Size of the 
municipality 
(average 
population) 
Presence 
of 
Desjardins 
Percent 
(%) 
Presence 
of banks 
Percent 
(%) 
More than 
700,000 
399 29.93 705 64.21 
200, 000 88 6.60 87 7.92 
57,000 96 7.20 74 6.74 
30,000 44 3.30 41 3.73 
12,500 34 2.55 37 3.37 
8,000 47 3.53 51 4.64 
5,000 47 3.53 43 3.92 
3,000 102 7.65 42 3.83 
Less than 
3,000 
476 35.71 18 1.64 
Total 1,333  1,098  
                                          Source: Desjardins (2011) 
 
Table 3 compares the prevalence in Québec of bank branches to Desjardins branches by community size. The 
Desjardins branches included 450 distinct caisses populaires at the end of 2010 (Desjardins, 2011). Although 
they are integrated within the Desjardins system, they operate with greater autonomy than a bank branch. Table 
3 shows clearly the disproportionate number of caisses populaires in RST areas, when compared to bank 
branches as a group. Communities of less than 3,000 contain almost 36% of Desjardins locations, but less than 
2% of bank branches. Communities of up to 8,000 residents contain over half of Desjardins branches and only 
14% of bank branches. The major difference, as noted, is in the communities of less than 3,000. When cities of 
700,000 or more are considered, they contain 64% of bank branches and only 30% of Desjardins branches. 
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Finally, to explore the bank branch/caisse populaire comparison in English Canada, we look at Atlantic Canada. 
We chose this part of Canada because it is smaller and therefore the data collection was more manageable. 
Credit unions and caisses populaires have also on average been in business in Atlantic Canada for over 60 
years (Thériault, Skibbens, & Brown, 2008). Data were collected in May and June 2011 from institution 
websites, provincial government websites, and Google Maps.3 Table 1 already illustrates that although there is 
some variation in degree, in all provinces credit unions are over-represented relative to the population in RST 
areas and under-represented in larger centres. Figure 2 indicates that for banks, their representation in RST 
areas more closely approximates the percentage of the population that is RST. Credit unions, as compared to 
the population distribution, are more heavily represented in RST areas. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of banks and credit unions in Atlantic Canada, 2010 
 
 
Source for population statistics: Statistics Canada (2008), 2006 Census. 
Note: Missing: 0; Chi-square = 27.820, d.f. = 1, p <. 000; Cramer’s V = .197 
 
As shown in Figure 3, for Atlantic Canada, the overall percentage of credit union branches of the total of credit 
union and bank branches in RST areas (populations under 10,000) is 46; the percentage of banks is 54. In 
urban areas (that is, everything that is not RST), the spread is more extreme: credit unions are 27% of the total 
while banks are 73%. In urban areas credit unions are under-represented as a percentage of financial 
institutions, while in RST areas banks and credit unions are more evenly represented. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of banks and credit unions in Atlantic Canada RST areas, 2010 
 
           Note: Missing: 0 Chi-square = 27.820, d.f. = 1, p <. 000 Cramer’s V = .197 
 
For Québec the more extreme spread is in the rural and small towns (populations 8,000 or less). In Québec 
caisses populaires constitute 81% of the total, while banks make up 19%. In urban areas in Québec, caisses 
populaires make up 41% of the total, while banks are 59%. 
 
 
Qualitative study 
To interpret the pattern of the data, we sought out key informants who were knowledgeable about the field. With 
the assistance of contacts in the credit union sector, we were able to recruit and interview seven leaders from 
credit unions and caisses populaires across Canada: 
 
• Vivian Campbell, Senior Consultant, Credit Union Services, Atlantic Central 
• Art Chamberlain, Media Relations Manager, Central 1 Credit Union, representing British Columbia 
and Ontario 
• Bill Langthorne, CEO, Credit Union Deposit Guarantee Corporation (CUDGC), Alberta, and 
Superintendent of Credit Unions 
• Ian MacPherson, Emeritus Professor of History, University of Victoria, specializing in the study of 
cooperatives and credit unions, and board member of British Columbia Credit Union Central 
• Alvina O’Brien, CEO, Eagle River Credit Union, Newfoundland and Labrador 
• Daniel Roussel, Advisory Manager, Cooperative Development and Democratic Governance 
Support, Mouvement Desjardins, Québec 
• Dale Smith, Executive Manager, Business Strategy & Innovation, TCU Financial Group, Saskatoon 
 
The interviewees were asked to give their overall impressions of our quantitative findings and say how they might explain 
them. We also asked whether they believed the geographic distribution of credit unions was strategic (i.e., to avoid 
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competition with urban banks) and whether they believed that credit unions were filling a niche in rural and small 
communities (where there are fewer banks). Some of our interviewees were able to offer a broad or historical perspective 
on Canada’s credit union sector, while others provided insight into specific regional concerns. 
 
Interview data findings 
In general, interview responses could be collapsed into two broad themes: 1) explanations as to why credit 
unions are a better match for rural and small communities, or put differently, the difference between credit 
unions/caisses populaires and banks; 2) the reasons why credit unions and caisses populaires are under-
represented in large urban centres. Here we address these themes in turn. 
 
The credit union/caisse populaire cifference 
Credit unions and caisses populaires offer many services that are similar to banks, but the interviewees 
emphasized the differences—both historical and philosophical. All of the interviewees alluded to one 
fundamental distinction: the primary orientation of banks is to meet the needs of their shareholders to make 
money, while the primary orientation of credit unions and caisses populaires is to provide a service to their 
members, and not to maximize profit. This should be viewed as a difference in degree, not a categorical 
difference, as service is also a priority for banks, and having a positive net income is of importance to credit 
unions and caisses populaires. Nevertheless, as one of the interviewees told us, “Credit unions are not as profit-
driven as banks.” Other interviewees made the same point in reference to the role that credit unions play in 
sustaining rural and small communities. When banks close branches in rural communities and small towns as a 
cost-cutting measure, credit unions and caisses populaires often become the only local financial institutions and 
provide services that the people in these communities would not be able to access otherwise. In the words of 
another interviewee, “Banks just don’t want to be bothered [with rural and small communities].”  
 
The interviewees also highlighted the differing historical roots of credit unions/caisses populaires and banks. 
One interviewee noted that Saskatchewan’s economy revolved around agriculture for much of the twentieth 
century, though recently mining of potash and oil and gas exploration have assumed greater importance. During 
the Great Depression, when banks would not finance farmers, credit unions were established in many of 
Saskatchewan’s communities. Looking at more contemporary times, the tendency for a credit union to maintain 
its presence in rural communities and small towns was noted. One interviewee described how credit unions took 
over bank locations when one of the major banks embarked on a branch reduction strategy in Western Canada 
ten years ago, saying: “It was a good business decision for the banks and for the credit unions.” 
 
Similarly, in the Atlantic, one of our interviewees noted the historical connection to the Antigonish Movement of 
the 1930s, when Catholic parishes led the organizing of credit unions. The interviewee emphasized that the 
over-representation of credit unions in rural and small communities “isn’t part of a strategy to go to these areas.” 
Instead, “Credit unions have made a concerted effort to stay in rural and small communities.” 
 
Another interviewee highlighted the historical uniqueness of Canadian credit unions, many of which emerged out of 
communities, churches, unions, and employee groups. This model, it was noted, was largely retained until the 1970s. 
However, there are significant regional differences in the historical development of credit unions. One interviewee noted 
that credit union growth in Newfoundland was, for the most part, driven by government-funded rural development 
organizations in communities needing a lower-cost service or a financial institution. 
 
The interviews suggest that there is a difference in philosophy among credit unions that distinguishes them from 
banks and a difference in tradition because credit unions have historical ties to rural and small communities that 
Mook, Hann, and Quarter (2012) 
 
51 
have persevered in spite of modernizing trends. As one interviewee told us, “There has always been a tendency 
to be closely identified with constituencies, and this impeded growth in some ways.” The constituencies could 
also be referred to as communities, either geographic or of mutual interest. 
 
Under-representation in large urban centres 
The data indicate that not only are credit unions and caisses populaires more prevalent in rural and small 
communities, but that they are also under-represented in large urban centres. To some extent, the relationship 
is reciprocal, but the interviewees discussed both and provided different explanations for the under-
representation. Desjardins, arguably, is the strongest system of financial cooperatives in Canada, but as noted, 
the rural tilt is striking. One interviewee emphasized this point, stating that in rural and small communities about 
80% of residents belong to the local caisse populaire, whereas in Montreal it is only 30%. It was explained that 
“Montreal is more Anglophone and more multicultural, whereas caisses have traditionally been more 
francophone and more Roman Catholic”—in other words, there isn’t as good of a cultural fit. Catholic parishes in 
Québec were leaders in organizing caisses populaires early in the twentieth century, and to a degree this 
connection has been maintained. In Montréal, however, the population is more cosmopolitan, more diverse, and 
more secular. Desjardins competes with the large banks in Montréal, where it lacks the dominance it has in 
small communities. Our Desjardins interviewee acknowledged this point: “It is difficult for caisses populaires to 
compete with banks.” Another interviewee noted that the prohibitive cost of advertising makes it difficult for 
credit unions to develop visibility and brand recognition in large urban markets like Toronto. 
 
One interviewee viewed the growing centralization of services by credit unions and caisses populaires as an 
attempt to compete more effectively with the banks. He argued that historically credit unions have engaged in 
“conservative entrepreneurship.” Credit union board members, the interviewee stated “are not flamboyant risk-
takers. They are aware that they are looking after their own funds, as well as those of their parents and 
neighbours, and will not go too far out on a limb.” It was noted that credit union mergers inevitably lead to 
centralization, and “greater centralization on the business side” can enable a credit union to offer a wider range 
of services and products (and compete more effectively with the banks). Another interviewee, however, raised 
some doubts about this strategy: “Mergers and amalgamations can help credit unions to create a stronger 
image. But it is not just about image. Credit unions need to offer a distinguishable service to members, like 
Mountain Equipment Co-operative does.” 
 
To some extent technological changes such as electronic banking have overridden geographic locations. This 
cuts two ways: one interviewee argued that “the bricks and mortar presence of credit unions is misleading 
because with the rise of electronic services, all areas can be served,” meaning that credit unions can serve a 
clientele in large urban centres even though they lack a strong physical presence there. However, another 
interviewee raised concerns about the opposite impact of electronic banking, that banks are able to serve a 
clientele in rural and small communities even though they have closed their branches there: “People’s savings 
are going into ING, PC, Manulife, but the people still want the [Desjardins] outlets. ... If you want the caisse to 
be a part of the community, the community should be part of the caisse.” 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our findings indicate that credit unions and caisses populaires are found disproportionately in rural and small-
town Canada, much like other cooperative enterprises that function independently of government programs 
(Quarter et al., 2012). The explanations of the data from the interviews suggest that a number of factors come 
into play: the credit union/caisse populaire tradition of being founded in rural and small-town Canada, the 
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abandonment of small communities by the large banks, and the challenges for credit unions and caisses 
populaires to compete with the banks in large urban centres. 
 
Market-failure theory has been applied to explain why organizations in the social economy or third sector are not 
more central to the economy, and the theory generally argues that such organizations emerge where the private 
sector loses interest because of insufficient profits (Ben-Ner, 1986; Hansmann, 1980; Weisbrod, 1974, 1977). 
The evidence that banks are abandoning rural and small communities and credit unions and caisses populaires 
are filling the void would be consistent with market-failure theory. For example, in the early 2000s, credit unions 
in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia purchased more than 
70 bank branches in communities where the six major banks4 had decided they would no longer operate 
(Canada, Department of Finance, 2003). However, market failure appears to be an overly simplistic explanation 
for this phenomenon. As noted, credit unions and caisses populaires have a lengthy history in some RST 
communities and have decided to stay there even though the net income might be greater in a more densely 
populated area. Provinces such as Saskatchewan and Québec, with a highly disproportionate number of credit 
unions in rural and small-town areas, are also those in which credit unions have had lengthy histories. 
 
A likely reason that credit unions remain in rural and small-town Canada concerns their member-based 
governance, a point that was raised in the introduction to this paper. As one interviewee commented, it is very 
difficult to close a credit union once it is established within a community (see also Sriram [2000] on this same 
point, with respect to Desjardins). The difficulty in closing credit union branches can be viewed as a function of a 
democratically elected board representing the members of a community with an interest in preserving the credit 
union. Bank executives do not face similar challenges in closing their branches. 
 
The willingness of credit unions to stay put might be viewed as part of the so-called cooperative difference; they 
are there to provide a service to members, not to maximize the returns to investors who may have no 
connection to small and rural communities. In the words of one interviewee: “When a credit union wants to close 
a branch, all hell will break loose—boards are reluctant to do this. When amalgamations happen, no staff will be 
lost, and no branches will be closed.” Mergers can lead to criticism from management as well as members, for 
example, Claude Béland, past president of Mouvement Desjardins, recently stated on CBC-Radio Canada that 
Desjardins’ cooperative philosophy has been weakened by mergers (CBC-Radio Canada, 2011). Banks are 
also scrutinized by the public, but not over issues such as democratic practices, but rather whether their profits 
are meeting expectations (a concern of investors) and whether their charges are excessive (a concern of 
consumers and public officials). 
 
Put differently, it could be argued that financial cooperatives face greater social expectations than banks. When 
cooperatives merge to compete more effectively with banks, they are held to a standard by their members. 
Banks have to be wary of consumer concerns, but unlike credit unions, their consumers are not active 
participants in decisions about mergers and location changes, but rather a passive voice taken into 
consideration by management. For credit unions, the consumers are members who are entitled to demand 
more, as a fundamental part of the cooperative difference. Moreover, as noted in Ketilson and Brown (2011), 
credit unions value member participation and are trying to find ways to keep their members engaged in 
decision-making with larger merged structures. 
 
When credit unions and caisses populaires are viewed in relation to the overall market, they may be seen as a 
niche player specializing in consumer loans to members and to small businesses owned by their members. 
They are able to thrive in smaller communities because, in the words of one interviewee, “Rural areas are more 
co-op minded.” Often credit unions are set up with the support of a sponsoring organization: a religious 
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congregation, ethnocultural association, workplace, or union. In some small communities, credit unions operate 
within a cluster of cooperatives—a store serving consumers, gas bar, et cetera. The Evangeline Credit Union in 
the Acadian region of Prince Edward Island is a classic example of this arrangement (Wilkinson & Quarter, 
1996). 
 
Therefore, even though elements of the data suggest that credit unions have agreed to operate within a space 
where the private sector is failing to deliver services, in the main the data suggest that credit unions serve a 
niche much like businesses in general. It is risky to compete against the large banks in major urban centres that 
are already saturated with financial institutions. It appears, as noted, that credit unions and caisses populaires 
are gearing up to do this by engaging in mergers that have sharply reduced the number of independent 
organizations. It remains to be seen whether this strategy will either lead to a stronger presence in urban 
centres or reduce the disproportionate credit union presence in rural and small-town Canada. 
 
Another issue raised in the interviews that bears scrutiny is electronic banking. It was raised primarily in the 
context of Desjardins but could be described as the proverbial elephant in the room. One component of the so-
called co-op advantage is that the consumers of the service are also members with presumably a greater 
commitment to the firm than the consumers of a bank. Applying the theory of Hirschman (1970), one might 
expect that members of a credit union would be less likely to exit than the clients of a bank, since membership 
implies a greater level of commitment than the consumption of services. This is a hypothetical point that has 
been made previously in the context of cooperatives (e.g., Jordan, 1989). However, this point requires empirical 
proof. The advent of electronic banking may create the context for such a test. 
 
As noted above, electronic banking, like electronic communication in general, extends the geographic reach of 
service users. Part of the cooperative advantage in rural and small-town Canada is its physical location within the 
community. This may be viewed as a competitive advantage that gives credit unions an edge in the market, as 
derived from market-advantage theory (Barney, 1991). It is less likely that residents of a small town will drive to a 
bank at some distance when a credit union is within walking distance. With electronic banking, will that continue to 
matter? Will that competitive advantage in small towns be lost with increased use of electronic services? At present, 
one advantage that banks have in urban markets is the convenience of branches in close proximity to clients; will 
credit unions be better able to penetrate urban markets because of electronic banking? One example of a 
cooperative that has been successful in engaging its members through the Internet is Mountain Equipment Co-op 
(MEC). The Internet allows MEC to sell to an international market and to engage thousands of participants in its 
annual general meeting (Quarter, Mook, & Armstrong, 2009). Credit unions may be able to follow the MEC example 
in the use of the Internet. This is something that should be observed carefully. 
 
 
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although this study proceed inductively, it speculates about possible explanations for the data, one being that 
the democratic structure of credit unions and caisses populaires makes it more challenging to move from a 
community once it is situated there. This hypothesis is something we intend to test as we extend the research to 
other jurisdictions, for example, parts of the United States, where data are currently being collected. If the 
democratic structure of cooperatives inhibits closing locations, one might expect that new credit unions would 
more likely be urban than older credit unions. Given the different contexts and legal environments, a 
comparative analysis with a rural/urban lens would bring additional insights to understanding why cooperative 
organizations are situated where they are. 
 
Mook, Hann, and Quarter (2012) 
 
54 
Also, with electronic banking becoming the norm rather than exceptional, it will be interesting to observe the 
impact upon credit unions: both their competitive advantage in small-town Canada and their ability to penetrate 
urban markets. It would be useful to know whether membership in a credit union increases customer loyalty 
beyond what it would be for a bank. 
 
It will also be interesting to follow the trend among credit unions and caisses populaires and see whether 
amalgamations reduce the proportion of credit unions that are located in rural and small-town Canada. Mergers, 
of course, decrease the number of distinct credit unions, and this would pertain to urban centres also. However, 
mergers may lead to increased memberships and larger assets. It is too early to determine whether this goal will 
succeed; at present, the primary niche for financial cooperatives appears to be rural communities and small-
towns across Canada. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study explores whether there is a rural tilt among credit unions and caisses populaires in Canada, using 
location of outlets as a measure. The data clearly show a pattern of over-representation of credit unions and 
caisses populaires in rural communities. The pattern is uneven across the country but there is over-
representation in all parts, especially in Québec and Saskatchewan. Bank locations in Québec and Atlantic 
Canada, by comparison, more closely reflected the population distribution. 
 
The strength of this study is the empirical pattern it presents. The weaknesses are whether location is the best measure 
to use, given the advent of electronic banking. For example, it is possible that residents in a location are using electronic 
means to access a financial institution located elsewhere. A second weakness of the study is that it does not test a 
theory; rather, because it proceeds inductively, it speculates about possible explanations for the data. A formal test of 
the phenomena discerned in this study is needed. For example, given the speculative argument that the democratic 
structure of credit unions may make moving from a community more difficult, one might expect that newer credit unions 
are more likely to be urban. This hypothesis could be tested empirically. 
 
This study may create a better understanding as to why credit unions and perhaps cooperatives more generally 
are more tilted to rural areas, given the current population distribution. Whether this understanding is of practical 
use depends upon whether members want to change that pattern. The unique feature of credit unions and 
cooperatives is that the members have a choice, should they decide to exercise it. 
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NOTES 
1. Appendix A shows the credit union and caisse location Websites accessed for this study. 
2. Service outlets are typically smaller than branches, with fewer staff and facilities. 
3. Appendix B shows the percentage of credit unions and banks of the total of both by province and 
population distribution. 
4. The six major banks are RBC, TD Canada Trust, Scotiabank, BMO, CIBC, and National Bank. 
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